In the Name of God, the Glorious.

Following our recent essay titled "The Educational Curriculum of Tanzeem-ul-Makatib: Not in the Dock of Accusation, but on the Table of Research," several colleagues raised questions, noting that the piece addressed only the concept of the "Special Deputy" (Na’ib al-Khas), whereas the curriculum references the term "Deputy of the Imam" (Na’ib al-Imam) in a general and succinct manner. Some sent us private messages containing a text currently circulating on Facebook under a different name, which concluded with the remark:

"If you are not someone’s operative, you will understand the point; but if you have been planted, then Allah will settle accounts with you."

We did not respond immediately, preferring first to complete our research and study on this matter so we could present its refined synthesis to our readers. As for the accusation of being an "operative," people often project their own disposition onto others. I consider myself a humble soldier of the Imam of the Age (‘Ajjal Allahu Ta’ala Farajahush-Sharif), in whose path my pen moves. I have never sought the favor of any person, nor have I ever feared anyone. I maintain an independent perspective and thought; moderation is my code, and using the pen in service of the truth is my duty. My pen is an entrustment from my Lord. In order to remove doubts and fulfill this academic necessity, I present the core findings of my study before you. I request a fair reading of the complete text; every constructive critique is welcome.

Introduction

Following the Major Occultation (Ghaybat) of the Imam of the Age (peace be upon him), a fundamental question arises: When the Infallible Imam (Imam al-Ma‘sum) is not physically present, to whom should the community turn in religious and collective affairs?

This question is not limited to personal ordinances such as prayer, fasting, khums, and marriage; rather, it extends to judiciary affairs (qada), endowments (awqaf), the protection of orphans, unclaimed property, social order, defense, political governance, and, in certain instances, warfare and jihad.

It is from this nexus that a broad juridical framework emerges, which subsequent jurists formulated using diverse terminologies:

General Deputyship (Niyabat al-Amm), Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih), Matters of Public Interest / Social Welfare (al-Umur al-Hasbiyyah), Religious Authority / Reference (Marja‘iyyah), and Guardianship of Affairs (Wilayat al-Amr).

Treating all these terms as absolute synonyms is an academic error. The foundational principle of this entire discourse is:

A fully qualified jurist (Faqih Jami‘ ash-Sharait) being a General Deputy does not automatically grant him all the prerogatives of the Infallible Imam (peace be upon him); nor does being a Marja‘ of emulation necessarily equate to being a Wali al-Amr (ruler of public order).

At the same time, it is incorrect to claim that the concept of jihad is completely negated during the Occultation. The core issue is far more nuanced.

The central questions are:

1. Is initiative jihad (Jihad al-Ibtida’i) permissible in itself during the Era of Occultation?
2. If permissible, can it become obligatory (wajib)?
3. If it can become obligatory, who holds the authority for its declaration, leadership, and execution?
4. If it is maintained that jihad remains applicable in the Occultation but requires the permission of the Deputy of the Imam (Na’ib al-Imam), an entirely new juridical inquiry begins.

Special and General Deputyship

1. Special Deputyship (Niyabat al-Khas): A Specific and Personal Office

During the Minor Occultation (Ghaybat as-Sughra), Imam al-Mahdi (peace be upon him) had four designated Special Deputies:

• Uthman ibn Sa‘id al-Amri (may Allah have mercy on him)
• Muhammad ibn Uthman al-Amri (may Allah have mercy on him)
• Husayn ibn Ruh al-Nawbakhti (may Allah have mercy on him)
• Ali ibn Muhammad al-Samarri (may Allah have mercy on him)

The defining feature of their deputyship was their specific, nominative appointment. They served as designated conduits between the Imam (peace be upon him) and the Shia community. However, with the commencement of the Major Occultation (Ghaybat al-Kubra), this specific arrangement concluded. Therefore, asserting today that any individual is a "Special Deputy" of the Imam of the Age contradicts the established historical understanding of Shia theology regarding the Occultation.

2. General Deputyship (Niyabat al-Amm): Not Restricted to a Single Individual

General Deputyship is not confined to one specific individual. Any jurist who fulfills the comprehensive criteria (Jami‘ ash-Sharait) can embody this title, provided he possesses the qualifications designated for this office.

Textual foundations exist for turning to jurists during the Major Occultation. In the well-known signed decree (Tawqi‘) attributed to the Imam of the Age (peace be upon him), it is stated:

«وَأَمَّا الْحَوَادِثُ الْوَاقِعَةُ فَارْجِعُوا فِيهَا إِلَى رُوَاةِ حَدِيثِنَا، فَإِنَّهُمْ حُجَّتِي عَلَيْكُمْ وَأَنَا حُجَّةُ اللَّهِ»¹
"And as for newly arising events, refer in them to the transmitters of our traditions, for they are my proof upon you, and I am the proof of Allah."

This narration stands as a primary piece of evidence for referring matters to jurists during the Occultation. Nonetheless, it should be noted that referring to the "transmitters" (ruwat)—understood by Usuli consensus as the jurists who deduce rulings—does not automatically mean every jurist inherits all governmental and political prerogatives of the Imam. Defining the exact scope of this deputyship requires independent juridical derivation.

The Nature of General Deputyship

Shia jurists agree on the necessity of turning to experts in Islamic jurisprudence during the Occultation. However, divergence arises concerning the extent of the jurist's mandate:

• Is the jurist’s authority restricted solely to issuing legal opinions (ifta)?
• Does it extend to adjudication and the judiciary (qada)?
• Does it apply to public interest and social welfare (al-umur al-hasbiyyah)?
• Or does it encompass expansive collective governance—meaning absolute political authority and complete governance?

This is where distinct juridical schools of thought diverge.

Juridical Perspectives on Initiative Jihad (Jihad al-Ibtida’i)

According to the mainstream majority (mashhur) of Shia scholars, three conditions are necessary for initiative jihad:

1. The Presence of the Infallible Imam: Consequently, during the Era of Occultation, initiative jihad is deemed non-permissible.
2. Sufficient Military Strength of Muslims: The community must possess adequate power to launch the campaign.
3. Invitation to Islam and Establishing the Proof (Itmam al-Hujjah): Prior to hostilities, opponents must be invited to Islam, and the truth must be made manifest to them.²

In addition, the direct presence and permission of the Infallible Imam—or his designated Special Deputy—is traditionally regarded as a non-negotiable prerequisite.³

The Majority Classical View: The Requirement of the Infallible Imam

A large segment of Shia jurists maintained that the presence of the Infallible Imam is a condition for initiative jihad. Proponents of this view include:

• Shaykh al-Tusi (385–460 AH)⁴
• Qadi Ibn al-Barraj (ca. 400–481 AH)⁵
• Ibn Idris al-Hilli (ca. 543–598 AH)
• Muhaqqiq al-Hilli (602–676 AH)⁶
• Allamah al-Hilli (648–726 AH)⁷
• Shahid al-Thani (911–955 or 965 AH)⁸
• The author of Jawahir al-Kalam, Shaykh Muhammad Hasan al-Najafi (1202–1266 AH)⁹

These jurists held that initiative jihad strictly requires the presence and authorization of the Infallible Imam, and this prerogative does not extend to General Deputies (the jurists).¹⁰

Scholars Who Permitted Initiative Jihad in the Occultation

This view, however, is not entirely unanimous. Several prominent classical jurists did not consider the presence of the Infallible Imam an absolute condition, thereby permitting initiative jihad during the Occultation if relevant conditions were met. These include:

• Shaykh al-Mufid¹¹
• Abu al-Salah al-Halabi¹²
• Sallar al-Daylami¹³

The Stance of Contemporary Jurists

Several contemporary Shia authorities have also questioned the necessity of the Infallible Imam's presence for initiative jihad. Among them:

• Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei¹⁴
• Sayyid Ali Khamenei¹⁵
• Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri¹⁶
• Ayatollah Muhammad Mo’men¹⁷
• Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi-Amoli, among others

These jurists argue that Quranic verses and prophetic/imamic traditions do not conclusively demonstrate that the physical presence of an Infallible Imam is a strict prerequisite for initiative jihad. They contend that if all other objective conditions are satisfied, initiative jihad can remain obligatory during the Occultation.¹⁸ In their analysis, the phrase "Just Leader" (Imam ‘Adil) found in certain traditions does not exclusively signify an Infallible Imam; it can also denote a just ruler or leader who fulfills the requisite legal criteria.

Analysis of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei’s Stance

Given his monumental standing in contemporary Shi'i jurisprudence, the perspective of Grand Ayatollah al-Khoei is pivotal. A widespread misconception suggests that because Ayatollah al-Khoei restricted the jurist’s governance to al-umur al-hasbiyyah (matters of public necessity and welfare), his view on jihad was similarly restrictive.

Textual analysis demonstrates otherwise. In Minhaj al-Salihin (Kitab al-Jihad), Ayatollah al-Khoei divides the problem into two distinct stages:

Stage One: Does original jihad require the permission of the Infallible Imam or his Special Deputy during the Occultation?

After analyzing the textual evidence and narrations, he concludes:

«وقد تحصل من ذلك أن الظاهر عدم سقوط وجوب الجهاد في عصر الغيبة وثبوته في كافة الأعصار لدى توفر شرائطه»¹⁹
"The conclusion derived from this is that, evidently, the obligation of jihad has not lapsed during the Era of Occultation; rather, it remains established in all eras whenever its conditions are met."

(It is worth noting that Ayatollah Hossein Vahid Khorasani, in his gloss on Minhaj al-Salihin at this exact juncture, differs from al-Khoei, remarking: «بل الظاهر السقوط»²⁰ — "Rather, the apparent conclusion is that it has lapsed.")

Ayatollah al-Khoei further states regarding the fulfillment of conditions:

«فإذا توفرت هذه الشرائط عندهم وجب عليهم الجهاد والمقاتلة معهم»²¹
"When these conditions are met, jihad and engagement in battle against them become obligatory upon them."

Thus, for Ayatollah al-Khoei, the matter is not merely one of "permissibility" (jawaz); he explicitly maintains the "non-lapse of obligation" (‘adam suqut al-wujub) and affirms that it becomes obligatory (wajaba ‘alayhim).

Stage Two: Who Holds the Authority to Authorize and Lead?

Ayatollah al-Khoei poses the subsequent inquiry:

«أنا لو قلنا بمشروعية أصل الجهاد في عصر الغيبة فهل يعتبر فيها إذن الفقيه الجامع للشرائط أولا؟»²²
"If we accept the legitimacy of original jihad during the Era of Occultation, is the permission of a fully qualified jurist (Faqih Jami‘ ash-Sharait) required or not?"

This conditional phrase (law qulna) should not be read in isolation to claim he rejected initiative jihad; he had already affirmed the continuity of its obligation in the preceding discussion. Turning to the question of authorization and command, he writes:

«فلا محالة يتعيّن ذلك في الفقيه الجامع للشرائط»²³
"Consequently, this responsibility inevitably devolves upon the fully qualified jurist."

He provides the foundational reasoning:

«فإنه يتصدى لتنفيذ هذا الأمر المهم من باب الحسبة»²⁴
"For he undertakes the execution of this grave matter under the mandate of Hasbah (Bab al-Hasbah)."

This is one of the most critical formulations in modern Shi'i legal theory. Ayatollah al-Khoei acknowledges the operational governance of the qualified jurist without deriving it from the broader doctrine of absolute guardianship (Wilayat al-Faqih al-Mutlaqah), as articulated by Imam Ruhollah Khomeini. Ayatollah al-Khoei roots his argument in the preservation of social order (hifz an-nizam), prevention of anarchy (harj wa marj), the necessity of unified leadership, and al-umur al-hasbiyyah. An endeavor as monumental as war requires a legitimate leader whose directives are obeyed by the community, lest unauthorized initiatives lead to widespread chaos.

Thus, leadership authority does not solely depend on the doctrine of absolute governance; essential collective responsibilities devolve upon the jurist by virtue of societal preservation and al-hasbah.

The Perspectives of Other Contemporary Jurists

Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani

On his official website regarding Wilayat al-Faqih, Ayatollah al-Sistani presents a precise structural division:

«الولاية فيما يعبّر عنها في كلمات الفقهاء (رض) بالامور الحسبية تثبت لكل فقيه جامع لشروط التقليد»²⁵
"Guardianship in what jurists term al-umur al-hasbiyyah is established for every jurist who fulfills the conditions of emulation."

He continues:

«وأما الولاية فيما هو أوسع منها من الامور العامة التي يتوقّف عليها نظام المجتمع الإسلامي فلمن تثبت له من الفقهاء ولظروف إعمالها شروط إضافية ومنها أن يكون للفقيه مقبولية عامة لدى المؤمنين»²⁶
"As for guardianship in broader general affairs upon which the order of Muslim society depends, for whoever among the jurists it is established, its implementation requires additional conditions—among which is that the jurist must enjoy general acceptability among the faithful."

This distinction is central: governance is not a monolithic rank. If the survival and defense of Islamic social order depend on war, the assessment rests with the jurist who shoulders social order, subject to these conditions and broad public legitimacy.

Distinguishing Between Marja‘ al-Taqlid and Wali al-Amr

• A Marja‘ al-Taqlid is a legal expert to whom individuals refer to ascertain religious rulings.
• A Wali al-Amr pertains to public order, executive decisions, and societal welfare.

A scholar may be a renowned Marja‘ while maintaining a distinct juridical perspective on the institutional extent of political governance. Hence, it is imprecise to assume that every Marja‘ is automatically a functional political leader (Wali al-Amr) or exercises all political prerogatives of the Infallible Imam.

Defensive Jihad (Jihad al-Difa‘i) vs. Initiative Jihad (Jihad al-Ibtida’i)

• Defensive Jihad: Triggered by foreign aggression against Muslim lives, lands, or sanctities. Defending life and property is an intrinsic, natural legal obligation. If an individual or community comes under attack, legitimate defense does not depend on awaiting the prior authorization of a Marja‘ or Deputy.
• Initiative Jihad: Pertains to initiating military action. It is specifically within this category that the discussion of judicial authorization—whether via Wilayat al-Amr or Bab al-Hasbah—becomes relevant.

Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei

Sayyid Ali Khamenei affirms that the Wali al-Faqih holds the authority to sanction initiative jihad when guided by public interest (maslahah al-‘ammah), stating:

*«بلکه این نظر اقوی است»*²⁷
"Rather, this view is the stronger (aqwa)."

While both Ayatollah al-Khoei and Sayyid Ali Khamenei agree that a qualified jurist can direct such military affairs during the Occultation, their legal foundations differ:

• Ayatollah al-Khoei grounds the obligation in original scriptural mandates, assigning its operational execution to the jurist via the legal principle of Hasbah and the imperative of preventing social chaos.
• Sayyid Ali Khamenei anchors this prerogative directly within the jurisdictional scope of Wilayat al-Amr and public interest (maslahah).²⁸

Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi-Amoli

Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli similarly affirms that military campaigns of this nature remain valid during the Occultation, but makes the authorization of the fully qualified Wali al-Faqih an indispensable, structural condition (luzum idhn Wali al-Faqih Jami‘ ash-Sharait).²⁹

Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri

Ayatollah Montazeri approached the category from a revisionist angle. He criticized definitions of initiative jihad that imply forced religious conversion, territorial expansionism, or subjugation of other nations. He fundamentally re-evaluated pure "initiative jihad," categorizing legitimate military endeavors under various dimensions of defensive warfare.³⁰

Four Juridical Trends in the Era of Occultation

The diverse approaches among Shia jurists can be classified into four primary frameworks:

1. Classical Majority / Strict Cessation: Initiative jihad is impermissible during the Occultation due to the absence of the Infallible Imam.
2. Conditional Continuity: The original obligation remains, but its application depends on strict traditional conditions.
3. Execution via Hasbah: The obligation persists, but its execution and authorization are strictly assigned to a qualified jurist to prevent societal disorder and chaos (the stance of Ayatollah al-Khoei).
4. Prerogative of the Wali al-Amr: The authority to initiate such action rests with the governing jurist (Wali al-Faqih) on the basis of overarching Islamic public interest (the stance of Ayatollah Khamenei).

Application to the Tanzeem-ul-Makatib Curriculum

The relevant curriculum passage states:

"Among us, jihad does not take place without the permission of the Deputy of the Imam [someone in authority]."
(«ہمارے ہاں جہاد بغیر نائبِ امام (کسی ذمہ دار) کی اجازت کے نہیں ہوتا»)

1. Societal and Historical Context in the Indian Subcontinent

Interpreting this statement within the multi-religious, constitutional, and historical framework of India reveals its fundamental intent:

Jihad is not an arbitrary, individual decision, nor is it the prerogative of non-state, irresponsible militias.

This statement reflects the core principles of jurisprudential discipline, social preservation (hifz an-nizam), and the public welfare. In a society where diverse faith communities coexist under a constitutional legal system, unsanctioned militant actions outside the institutional framework create destructive instability (fasad). Preventing individuals or fringe groups from unilaterally declaring armed conflict is a crucial safeguard.

2. "Deputy of the Imam" Does Not Exclusively Mean "Wali al-Faqih"

When this curriculum was drafted, the contemporary institutionalized model of Wilayat al-Faqih had not taken its modern political shape. In this context, "Deputy of the Imam" (Na’ib al-Imam) served as an overarching reference to:

• Competent religious authorities,
• Legitimate qualified jurists (fuqaha),
• Recognized communal spiritual leadership,
• Or responsible institutional oversight designed to prevent vigilantism.

The phrase functions as a safeguard against individual militancy rather than a technical endorsement of a specific political structure.

3. Proposed Academic Clarification for Contemporary Contexts

To harmonize the traditional text with contemporary pedagogical and legal clarity, the passage can be elucidated for students as follows:

"During the Era of Occultation, legal rulings on jihad depend entirely on its nature. Regarding initiative jihad, jurists differ: some consider it suspended in the absence of the Infallible Imam, while others maintain it remains valid under strict conditions, requiring the express authorization of a qualified jurist or public authority (Wali al-Amr). Conversely, defensive jihad is a universal obligation to protect life, property, and sanctities. Under no circumstances does an individual or an unauthorized fringe group have the legal or religious authority to unilaterally declare armed conflict."

This framing preserves the pedagogical intent of the original curriculum, accurately reflects internal jurisprudential differences, and prevents misapplication in contemporary societies.

The Decisive Jurisprudential Distinction: Legitimacy vs. Authority to Execute

The core analytical issue in this debate is the distinction between two questions:

1. Is initiative jihad legitimate in principle during the Occultation?
2. If legitimate, who holds the exclusive authority to authorize, declare, and execute it?

Even if a jurist affirms its theoretical legitimacy, the question of operational command remains distinct. As Ayatollah al-Khoei noted:

«تصدي غيره لذلك يوجب الهرج والمرج»³²
"The undertaking of this matter by anyone other than him [the qualified jurist] would lead to chaos and anarchy."

Because war impacts the entire existence of a community, military action cannot be initiated by individual whim, vigilantism, sectarian excitement, or isolated interpretations of scriptural texts. This fundamental principle distinguishes institutional Islamic jurisprudence from the vigilante actions seen in contemporary extremist networks (such as ISIS).

Conclusion

General Deputyship (Niyabat al-Amm) does not signify that any single jurist becomes an all-encompassing, absolute replacement for the Infallible Imam (peace be upon him). Rather, it represents an established jurisprudential system for deriving religious rulings, providing moral leadership, and administering essential societal necessities during the Major Occultation—the exact limits of which remain subject to valid legal interpretation (ijtihad).

Similarly, the question of whether jihad is theoretically legitimate is distinct from the question of who holds the operational authority to declare it:

• Grand Ayatollah al-Khoei affirmed the continuity of the original obligation, yet strictly restricted its operational authorization to the qualified jurist through the principle of Hasbah to preserve public order and prevent chaos.
• Ayatollah Khamenei situates this prerogative directly within the authority of Wilayat al-Amr, conditioned upon the collective interest (maslahah) of the Muslim community.
• Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani maintains a rigorous distinction between baseline governance in al-umur al-hasbiyyah and broader public leadership, which requires societal acceptance.

Therefore, General Deputyship represents the jurist's responsibility across defined domains of legal and collective administration during the Occultation. This balanced approach provides the most coherent framework for harmonizing historical jurisprudence, contemporary scholarly differences, and the foundational educational material of institutions like Tanzeem-ul-Makatib.

May Allah grant us the clarity to seek truth free from prejudice and partisanship.

Footnotes and References

1. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Tusi, Kitab al-Ghaybah, "Bab al-Tawqi‘at," signed decree of Ishaq ibn Ya‘qub; see also Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Hurr al-‘Amili, Wasa’il al-Shi‘ah, vol. 27, "Abwab Sifat al-Qadi," ch. 11, hadith 9.
2. Muhammad-Javad Fazel Lankarani, "Initiative Jihad in the Holy Quran" (Jihad-e Ibtida’i dar Quran-e Karim), official website of Ayatollah Lankarani.
3. "Initiative Jihad in the Prophetic Sunnah and Biography," Islamic Research Foundation, Astan Quds Razavi.
4. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Tusi, Al-Mabsut fi Fiqh al-Imamiyyah, Tehran: Al-Maktabah al-Murtadawiyyah, 1387 AH.
5. Qadi Ibn al-Barraj, Jurisprudential Inquiries on Initiative Jihad.
6. Ja‘far ibn al-Hasan, al-Muhaqqiq al-Hilli, Shara’i‘ al-Islam fi Masa’il al-Halal wal-Haram, Qom: Isma‘iliyan, 1408 AH.
7. Hasan ibn Yusuf, al-Allamah al-Hilli, Tadhkirat al-Fuqaha, Qom: Mu’assasat Al al-Bayt li-Ihya’ al-Turath, 1414 AH.
8. Zayn al-Din ibn Ali, al-Shahid al-Thani, Al-Rawdah al-Bahiyyah fi Sharh al-Lum‘ah al-Dimashqiyyah, ed. Sayyid Muhammad Kalantar, Qom: Maktabat al-Dawari, 1410 AH.
9. Muhammad Hasan al-Najafi, Jawahir al-Kalam fi Sharh Shara’i‘ al-Islam, Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-‘Arabi, 1362 Sh.
10. Sayfollah Sarrami and Sa‘id Edalatnezhad, "Jihad," Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam, Tehran: Encyclopaedia Islamica Foundation, 1386 Sh.
11. Muhammad ibn Muhammad, al-Shaykh al-Mufid, Al-Muqni‘ah, Qom: Mu’assasat al-Nashr al-Islami, 1410 AH.
12. Abbas-Ali Amid Zanjani, Fiqh-e Siyasi (Political Jurisprudence), Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1377 Sh.
13. Hamzah ibn Abd al-Aziz, Sallar al-Daylami, Al-Marasim fi al-Fiqh al-Imami, ed. Mahmud Bustani, Qom: Manshurat al-Haramayn, 1404 AH.
14. Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Minhaj al-Salihin, Qom: Madinat al-‘Ilm, 1410 AH, "Kitab al-Jihad."
15. Sayyid Ali Khamenei, Educational Treatise (Risalah Amuzishi) According to the Fatawa of Ayatollah Khamenei, Tehran: Islamic Revolution Cultural Research Institute, 1398 Sh.
16. Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Answers to Inquiries on Islamic Penalties and Human Rights, Qom: Nashr-e Arghavan-e Danesh, 1429 AH.
17. Muhammad Mo’men, "Initiative Jihad in the Era of Occultation," Fiqh Ahl al-Bayt Journal, issue 26, Summer 1380 Sh.
18. Muhammad-Taqi Misbah-Yazdi, War and Jihad in the Quran, Qom: Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, 1383 Sh; see also Ethics in the Quran, 1391 Sh.
19. Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Minhaj al-Salihin, "Kitab al-Jihad," vol. 1, pp. 364–366, Al-Khoei Charitable Foundation.
20. Hossein Vahid Khorasani, Minhaj al-Salihin, "Kitab al-Jihad," marginal gloss: «بل الظاهر السقوط» ("Rather, the apparent conclusion is that it has lapsed").
21. Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Minhaj al-Salihin, "Kitab al-Jihad," vol. 1, p. 365.
22. Ibid., pp. 365–366.
23. Ibid., p. 366.
24. Ibid., p. 366.
25. Office of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, official legal inquiries (istifta'at), chapter on Wilayat al-Faqih, query regarding al-umur al-hasbiyyah.
26. Ibid., section on public order and governance.
27. Sayyid Ali Khamenei, official inquiry regarding initiative jihad, Istifta No. 148.
28. Ibid.
29. Abdollah Javadi-Amoli, Q&A on Initiative Jihad in the Occultation and the Requirement of Authorization from the Qualified Wali al-Faqih.
30. Hossein-Ali Montazeri, Dirasat fi Wilayat al-Faqih wa Fiqh al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah, Qom: Al-Markaz al-Alami lil-Dirasat al-Islamiyyah, 1409 AH.
31. Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Minhaj al-Salihin, vol. 1, pp. 365–366; Office of Ayatollah al-Sistani, official legal inquiries.
32. Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Minhaj al-Salihin, "Kitab al-Jihad," vol. 1, p. 366.